




Fred Wertheimer is president of Common Cause, a national citizens’lobbying organiza-
tion. He joined the organization as a lobbyist in 1971 and became president in 1981. He has
been Common Cause’s chief lobbyist on campaign finance reform and served as director of
its Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. Before joining Common Cause, he served as
minority counsel to the House Small Business Committee, as legislative counsel to
Congressman Silvio Conte, and as an attorney with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Mr. Wertheimer is a graduate of the University of Michigan and Harvard Law
School.
ABSTRACT: In 1974, following the Watergate scandal, Congress enacted
major campaign finance reform legislation. The legislation created a
revolutionary new public financing system for our presidential campaigns,
but it left congressional campaigns to be financed totally by private money.
The presidential public financing system has worked well. Despite some
incremental problems, the system has accomplished its basic goal of
allowing individuals to run for the presidency without becoming dependent
on their financial backers. The system for financing congressional cam-
paigns, on the other hand, is out of control and in need of fundamental
reform. The inappropriate role of special interest political action commit-
tees (PACs) in influencing congressional elections and congressional
decisions is the single biggest problem facing the political process.
Congress needs to complete the unfinished campaign finance reform
agenda of the 1970s by enacting public financing for congressional
campaigns and establishing new restrictions on the total amount that
PACs may give to a congressional candidate.
NOTE: The author wishes to acknowledge the important contributions made in the preparation of
this article by Common Cause staff members Marcy Frosh, Carole Geithner, Randy Huwa, Ann
McBride, and Jane Mentzinger.
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nUR democracy is founded on the
concept of representation. Citizens
elect leaders who are given responsibil-
ity to weigh all the competing and
conflicting interests that reflect our
diversity and to decide what, in their
judgment, will best advance the interests
of the citizenry.
It is obviously a rough system. It
often does not measure up to the ideal
we might hope to attain. But we con-
tinue to place our trust in this system
because we believe our best chance at
governing ourselves lies in obtaining the
best judgment of elected representatives.
Unfortunately, that is not happening
today. We are not obtaining the best
judgment of our elected representatives
in Congress because they are not free to
give it to us. As a result of our present
congressional campaign financing sys-
tem-and the increasing role of political
action committee (PAC) campaign con-
tributions-members of Congress are
rapidly losing their ability to represent
the constituencies that have elected
them.
We have long struggled to prevent
money from being used to influence
government decisions. We have not
always succeeded, but we have never lost
sight of the goal. Buying influence vio-
lates our most fundamental democratic
values. We have long recognized that
the ability to make large campaign con-
tributions does, in fact, make some
more equal than others. In the mid-
1960s, for example, Senator Russell
Long, Democrat of Louisiana, observed,
One sweet woman was on the opposite side
[in an election] and thought they were going
to lose and came charging in there with a
couple of hundred thousand dollars to pump
up their side.... Anybody who would
suggest that she had no more influence than
any other sweet old lady in a calico dress just
does not know anything about politics:’
Beginning in the early 1970s, Com-
mon Cause and other election reform
groups pressed for fundamental changes
in the campaign finance statutes. The
goals were to end secrecy in campaign
financing, to limit the influence of large
contributions, to enable candidates of
modest means to seek office without
becoming beholden to campaign donors,
and to increase competition in the polit-
ical process. The reform agenda called
for:
-effective campaign contribution
and expenditure reporting require-
ments ;
-limits on the size of individual and
group campaign contributions;
-a system of public financing of
campaigns, including candidate
access to federal funds and limits
on spending; and
-effective enforcement by an inde-
pendent agency.
This reform agenda took on a new
importance in the wake of Watergate,
our nation’s greatest political scandal.
Watergate revealed that our govern-
ment was literally up for sale. The
money came in the form of funds con-
tributed for the presidential campaign.
As the then chairman of American Air-
lines explained:
The law ... is based on a system by which
candidates for public office must seek funds
from persons affected by the actions of such
candidates when elected to office. The sys-
1. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Finance, Hearings on S. 3496, Amendment No.
732, S. 2006, S. 2965, and S. 3014, 89th Cong., 2d
sess., 1966, p. 78.
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tem provides no limits on the total amount
that may be raised or spent and hence places
a premium on pressure to raise greater and
greater amounts . 
2
In its final report, the Senate Water-
gate Committee concluded that, as a
result of the systematic solicitation of
corporate donors, 12 major corpora-
tions gave approximately $749,000 in
illegal contributions to the Nixon cam-
paign.’ Corporate executives testified
that they succumbed to such solicitations
as a way of gaining access to administra-
tion decision makers and also out of fear
of experiencing competitive disadvan-
tages if they failed to contribute. Said
one Gulf Oil executive, &dquo;I considered it
considerable pressure when two Cabinet
officers and an agent of one of the
committees that was handling the elec-
tion ... ask[ed] me for funds-that is
just a little bit different than somebody
collecting for the Boy Scouts.&dquo; 
4
The Milk Producers Association’s
pledge of $2 million to President Nixon’s
reelection campaign was linked in the
public’s mind to the increase in milk
price supports. More than $1.8 million
in contributions to the Nixon campaign
came from people who received ambas-
sadorial appointments during his
administration.’
Reflecting on the meaning of Water-
gate, John Gardner, founder and former
chairman of Common Cause, wrote at
the time:
In almost every aspect of Watergate, there
was one common element: the flow of secret
campaign cash. There are honest donors to
political campaigns and honest recipients;
but the existence of these does not outweigh
the fact that the present system legitimizes
the buying and selling of politicians. The
old-style, flat-footed cash bribe has been
replaced by the campaign gift, its all-purpose,
prepackaged modern equivalent.’
The result of these revelations, not
surprisingly, was an alarming drop in
citizens’ confidence in their government.
Pollster Louis Harris in 1973 told a
Senate committee that &dquo;public confi-
dence in government generally must be
reported as being lower than a constit-
uent democracy can afford.&dquo;’
The nation’s greatest political scan-
dal led to one of the nation’s most
historic and revolutionary reforms, the
public financing of our presidential
elections. Congress enacted public
financing to prevent private campaign
contributions from being used as a vehi-
cle for obtaining influence with the
president of the United States. Under
this system, limits were placed on the
size of contributions, overall expendi-
tures were capped, and an alternative
source of campaign money was created:
public funds generated by the dollar
checkoff on the federal income tax.’
2. D. Michal Freedman, The Watergate
Reforms: Ten Years After (Washington, DC:
Common Cause, 1983), p. 16.
3. U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final
Report, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 446.
4. Ibid., p. 471.
5. Ibid., pp. 127, 492-93, 579. See Fred
Wertheimer and Randy Huwa, "Campaign
Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future
Challenges," N w York University Review of Law
and Social Change, 10:44 (1980-81). Unless
otherwise noted, figures used in this article are
based on analyses prepared by Common Cause of
campaign finance disclosure statements filed with
the Federal Election Commission.
6. Freedman, Watergate Reforms, p. 17.
7. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, Hearings on a Survey of
Public Attitudes, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973,
pp. 6-8.
8. FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, &sect;&sect; 101-302, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47
U.S.C.).
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Unfortunately, the same progress
was not made at the congressional level.
Although Congress established limits
on contributions by both individuals
and PACs and placed limits on overall
expenditures,9 members of Congress
were unwilling to take the last crucial
step-to establish an alternative public
source of campaign funds for their own
campaigns. While congressional public
financing was passed by the Senate, the
House narrowly rejected it, by a vote of
187 to 228, and the provision was
dropped in conference. At the same
time, in a major step backward and over
the objections of reform groups, Con-
gress opened the door for an increased
role in special interest giving by repeal-
ing a prohibition on the formation of
PACs by government contractors. 10 As
a result of these actions, campaign con-
tributions remain a powerful vehicle for
obtaining access and influence in the
United States Congress.
The presidential and congressional
campaign-financing systems thus require
sharply different types of reform today.
Comprehensive legislation must be
enacted to remedy the defects in the
system for financing congressional cam-
paigns. Limits on overall PAC receipts
must be established. A public financing
system must be created to provide over-
all spending limits and adequate alter-
native funding so that candidates are no
longer dependent on special interest
group contributions. In contrast, the
system of financing presidential cam-
paigns has already been successfully
transformed. While significant adjust-
ments are needed in order to deal with
new problems that have arisen, such as
soft money and independent expendi-
tures, these changes are required to
preserve the integrity of an existing




Simply stated, the presidential public
financing system is an idea that works; it
is the crowning achievement of the
amendments adopted in 1974 to the
Federal Election Campaign Act. Under
the system, candidates who agree to
abide by limits on overall campaign
spending and the expenditure of per-
sonal wealth are able to receive federal
tax dollars, funds designated to a sepa-
rate account by individual taxpayers.
Public funds are available to match
small private contributions raised by
candidates during the nominating pro-
cess ; for the general election, major-
party candidates are entitled to full
campaign funding with public dollars.
In the three elections for which this
new system has been in place-1976,
1980, and 1984-presidential public
financing has been successful. Thirty-
four of the 35 major party candidates
since the law was passed have chosen to
participate in this voluntary system. Pres-
idential public financing has checked
the increase in presidential campaign
expenditures. Presidential contenders
no longer must &dquo;tin-cup it around the
country&dquo; in search of campaign funds.’ 
‘
In contrast to the presidential contest of
1972, candidates are no longer dependent
on a relatively few fat-cat contributors;
rather, the funding base for campaigns
is broad. PAC contributions play a
9. The limits on overall expenditures were
struck down by the Supreme Court in the land-
mark case Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1(1976).
10. Act of 14 June 1940, chap. 640, &sect; 5(a), 54
Stat. 772 (repealed 1976).
11. "Fat Cat as Endangered Species," Wash-
ington Post, 26 June 1980.
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minor role in presidential campaigns.
PACs gave less than $1.5 million to 1984
presidential candidates, or less than 2
percent of the total funds raised. As the
New York Times has observed, &dquo;Public
financing confers on Presidential candi-
dates the freedom not to grovel.&dquo;’2
Public financing also confers an
added freedom to govern without the
strings attached by large donors or
public suspicion that such strings exist.
The Carter and Reagan presidencies
have been relatively free of the hint that
government favors have been traded for
large campaign contributions. Stories
linking the influence of campaign contri-
butions with official actions in the legis-
lative branch are common;’3 for the
executive branch, very rare. The Com-
mission on National Elections, headed
by Melvin Laird and Robert Strauss,
concluded,
Public financing of presidential elections has
clearly proved its worth in opening up the
process, reducing undue influence of indi-
viduals and groups, and virtually ending
corruption in presidential election finance.




While the presidential campaign
finance system stands as a model for
reform, the congressional campaign sys-
tem is out of control and in need of
fundamental repair.
The last decade of congressional
campaign financing has been marked by
an exponential increase in the number
of PACs formed by corporations, labor
unions, trade associations, and other
groups. In 1974 there were 608 PACs.
Today there are more than 4000.
This explosion in PACs can be traced
to congressional action-and inaction-
in 1974. Ironically, at the very time when
members of Congress were acting to
clean up presidential elections, they
opened the door for PACs to enter the
congressional arena in an unprecedented
way. The key to the PAC explosion was
a provision attached to the 1974 law by
labor and business groups, over the
opposition of Common Cause and other
reform advocates, that authorized gov-
ernment contractors to establish PACs. ~ ~
In addition, by creating public financing
for presidential campaigns, but not for
congressional races, the 1974 amend-
ments focused the attention and interest
of PACs and other private campaign
donors on Congress.
The resulting growth in PACs was no
accident, and it certainly was not a
reform. The growth of PACs, moreover,
is certainly no unintended consequence
of the 1974 law-the provision was
12. "Sneak Attack on Campaign Finance,"
New York Times, 3 June 1985.
13. See, for example, Common Cause, How
Money Talks in Congress: A Common Cause
Study of the Impact of Money on Congressional
Decision-Making (Washington, DC: Common
Cause, 1979); Wertheimer and Huwa, "Campaign
Finance Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future
Challenges," pp. 49, 51, 52, 53; Walter Isaacson,
"Running with the PACs" Time, 25 Oct. 1982,
pp. 20-26; Brooks Jackson and Jeffrey Birnbaum,
"Dairy Lobby Obtains U.S. Subsidies with Help
from Urban Legislators," Wall Street Journal, 18 
Nov. 1983; Judith Bender, "The PAC Game on
Capitol Hill," Newsday, 12 Mar. 1984; Brooks
Jackson, "PAC Helps Push Pet Electric Bill,"
Wall Street Journal, 29 Mar. 1984; and Jeffrey
Sheler and Robert Black, "Is Congress for Sale?"
U.S. News and World Report, 28 May 1984,
pp. 47-50.
14. Report of the Commission on National
Elections, Executive Summary (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1985), p. 7.
15. 2 U.S.C. &sect; 441c(b) (1976).
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included to protect and enhance the role
of PACs in financing campaigns, and it
has.
This tremendous increase in the
number of PACs has not resulted in
balanced representation in Washington.
As Senator Gary Hart, Democrat of
Colorado, has told the Senate:
It seems the only group without a well-heeled
PAC is the average citizen-the voter who
has no special interest beyond low taxes, an
efficient government, an honorable Congress,
and a humane society. Those are the demands
we should be heeding-but those are the
demands the PACs have drowned out.’6
In fact, the increasing number of PACs
has largely served to increase the ability
of single interests to bring pressure to
bear on a congressional candidate or a
member of Congress. There are more
than 100 insurance company PACs,
more than 100 PACs sponsored by
electric utilities, and more than 300
sponsored by labor unions. Representa-
tive David Obey, Democrat of Wiscon-
sin, has observed that frequently in
Washington
an issue affects an entire industry and all of
the companies and labor unions in that
industry.... When that occurs, [and] a large
number of groups which have made substan-
tial contributions to members are all lobby-
ing on the same side of an issue, the pressure
generated from those aggregate contribu-
tions is enormous and warps the process. It is
as if they had made a single, extremely large
contribution.&dquo;
The increase in the number of PACs,
not surprisingly, has also produced a
tremendous increase in PAC contribu-
tions to congressional candidates. In
1974, PACs gave $12.5 million to con-
gressional candidates. By the 1984 elec-
tions, their contributions had exceeded
$100 million, an eightfold increase in ten
years.
PAC money also represents a far
more important part of the average
candidate’s campaign funds than it did
ten or so years ago. In 1974,15.7 percent
of congressional candidates’ campaign
money came from PACs; by the 1984
election, that proportion had increased
to 30 percent.
Yet these numbers only begin to tell
the story. The increased dependence on
PAC contributions has been greatest for
winners, those individuals who serve in
Congress and who cast votes that shape
our daily lives. In the Ninety-ninth Con-
gress (1985-86), over 150 House mem-
bers received 50 percent or more of their
campaign funds from PACs, includ-
ing 20 of the 27 committee chairs and
party leaders. House winners in the 1984
election received an average of 41 per-
cent of their campaign dollars from
PACs. Of all winning House candidates
in the 1974 election, only 28 percent
received one-third or more of their cam-
paign funds from PACs. By 1984, that
figure had grown to 78 percent.
For senators, PAC contributions are
also becoming a more important source
of campaign dollars. Senators elected in
1976 received a total of $3.1 million
from PACs; Senate winners in the 1984
election raised $20 million from PACs.
In the 1984 elections, 23 winning Senate
candidates raised more than $500,000
each from PACs.
Some have suggested that the growth
in PACs is an important new form of
citizen involvement in the political
process. Yet PAC participation is often
16. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 131(165):16683.
17. Statement of Congressman David R.
Obey, Democratic Study Group, 26 July 1979,
quoted in Fred Wertheimer, "The PAC Phenom-
enon in American Politics," Arizona Law Review,
22:622-23, n. 114(1980).
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likely to be more of an involvement in
the corporate process or the union pro-
cess or the trade association process
than it is in the political process.
University of Minnesota professor Frank
J. Sorauf has noted:
To understand political participation through
PACs, we need also to note the nature of the
participation. Some of it is not even political
activity; buying a ticket in a raffle, the
proceeds of which go to a PAC, a party, or a
candidate, does not qualify as a political act
by most standards. Even the contributory
act of writing a check or giving cash to a
PAC is a somewhat limited form of partici-
pation that requires little time or immediate
involvement; in a sense it buys political
mercenaries who free the contributor from
the need to be personally active in the
campaign. It is one of the least active forms
of political activity, well suited to the very
busy or to those who find politics strange,
boring, or distasteful.&dquo;
In fact, the growth of PACs and the
increased importance of PAC money
have had a negative effect on two dif-
ferent parts of the political process-
congressional elections and congres-
sional decision making. First, PAC
money tends to make congressional cam-
paigns less competitive because of the
overwhelming advantage enjoyed by
incumbents in PAC fund-raising. The
ratio of PAC contributions to incum-
bents over challengers in 1984 House
races was 4.6 to 1.0; in the Senate, incum-
bents in 1984 enjoyed a 3.0 to 1.0 advan-
tage in PAC receipts. On the average,
1984 House incumbents raised $100,000
more from PACs than did challengers.
This $100,000 advantage was true even
in the most highly competitive House
races, those in which the incumbent
received 55 percent or less of the vote. In
these races, incumbents received an aver-
age of over $230,000 from PACs; their
challengers received less than $110,000.
The advantage enjoyed by incumbents is
true for all kinds of PAC giving-for
contributions by labor groups, corpo-
rate PACs, and trade and membership
PACs.
Second, there is a growing awareness
that PAC money makes a difference in
the legislative process, a difference that
is inimical to our democracy. PAC
dollars are given by special interest
groups to gain special access and special
influence in Washington. Most often,
PAC contributions are made with a
legislative purpose in mind. The late
Justin Dart, former chairman of Dart
Industries, once noted that dialogue
with politicians &dquo;is a fine thing, but with
a little money they hear you better.&dquo;’9
Senator Charles Mathias, Republican
of Maryland, has stated:
An official may not change his or her vote
solely to accommodate the views of such
contributors, but often officials, including
myself, will agree to meet with an individual
who made a large contribution so the official
can hear the contributor’s concerns and
make the contributor aware these concerns
have been considered.... Since an elected
official has only so much time available, the
inevitable result of such special treatment for
the large contributor is that other citizens are
denied the opportunity they otherwise would
have to confer with the elected official.2°
Common Cause and others have pro-
duced a number of studies that show a
relationship between PAC contributions
18. Frank Sorauf, "PACs in the American
Political System" (Background paper, Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Political Action
Committees, 1984), pp. 82-83.
19. "Companies Organize Employees and
Holders into a Political Force," Wall Street
Journal, 15 Aug. 1978.
20. Brief for Appellees, p. 53, Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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and legislative behavior. The examples
run the gamut of legislative decisions,
including hospital cost containment, the
Clean Air Act, domestic content legisla-
tion, dairy price programs, gun control,
maritime policies, and regulation by the
Federal Trade Commission of profes-
sional groups or of used-car sales.&dquo;
PAC gifts do not guarantee votes or
support. PACs do not always win. But
PAC contributions do provide donors
with critical access and influence; they
do affect legislative decisions and are
increasingly dominating and paralyzing
the legislative process.
In the last few years, something very
important and fundamental has hap-
pened in this country-and that is the
development of a growing awareness
and recognition of the fact that the PAC
system is a rotten system that must be
changed. We know that concern is grow-
ing when Irving Shapiro, former chair-
man and chief executive officer of
duPont and the former chairman of the
Business Roundtable, describes the cur-
rent system of financing congressional
campaigns as &dquo;an invidious thing, it’s
corrupting, it does pollute the system.&dquo;22
We know that concern is reaching
new audiences when Business Week
editorializes that
fears are growing that the proliferation of
PACs ... is balkanizing the nation’s political
process as swarms of candidates and well-
heeled special interest groups jostle to trade
political favors for money.... It would be
hard to find a PAC that gives solely to
support good government. Most see their
contribution as an investment in promoting
laws favoring their interests. 23
And Chemical Week warns:
[A] new force has intruded into our system
of representative democracy that, if un-
checked, could topple it or seriously hurt
it. We refer to the phenomenon of Political
Action Committees.... The plain truth
of the matter, no matter what gloss is put
on it, is that PAC money aims at influ-
encing congressional action. The other side
of the coin is that new candidates and
incumbents alike become beholden to their
PAC benefactors. That’s the whole point,
isn’t it?Za
Criticism of the PAC system is also
increasingly heard in the halls of Con-
gress. More and more members from
both parties are speaking out about
the PAC problem. Consider the fol-
lowing :
[The present campaign-financing system]
virtually forces members of Congress to go
around hat in hand, begging for money from
Washington-based special interest political
action committees, whose sole purpose for
existing is to seek a quid pro quo.... the
scandal is taking place every day and will
continue to do so while the present system is
in place.25
PAC money is destroying the election pro-
cess. It is breaking down public confidence in
21. See, for example, Common Cause, "How
Money Talks in Congress"; Wertheimer and
Huwa, "Campaign Finance Reforms: Past
Accomplishments, Future Challenges," pp. 49, 51,
52, 53; Isaacson, "Running with the PACs," pp.
20-26; Jackson and Birnbaum, "Dairy Lobby
Obtains U.S. Subsidies"; Bender, "PAC Game on
Capitol Hill"; Jackson, "PAC Helps Push Pet
Electric Bill"; and Sheler and Black, "Is Congress
for Sale?"
22. Nina Easton, "Swimming against the
Tide," Common Cause Magazine, 9(5):13 (Sept.-
Oct. 1983).
23. "How to Curb PAC Power but Not Free
Speech," Business Week, 22 Nov. 1982.
24. Patrick P. McCurdy, "Let’s Pack in the
PACs&mdash;All of Them," Chemical Week, 15 Aug.
1984, p. 3.
25. Statement of Senator Thomas Eagleton, in
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and
Administration, Hearings on Campaign Finance
Reform Proposals of 1983, 98th Cong., 1st sess.,
1983, p. 52.
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free elections and it is ruining the character
and quality of campaigns. 21
In addition, the growth in the influence of
PAC’s further fragments our Nation and its
elected legislative bodies. It makes it increas-
ingly difficult to reach a national consensus
and hold[s] our decisionmaking process
hostage to the special interests which PAC’s
represent.... We cannot expect Members of
Congress to act in the national interest when
their election campaigns are being financed
more and more by special interests . 21
In addition to the growing role of
PAC contributions, the congressional
campaign-financing system is also
marked by unlimited and skyrocketing
spending. In 1974, House and Senate
candidates spent $77 million on con-
gressional races. Ten years later, House
and Senate candidates spent a record
$374 million, almost five times as much.
The cost of winning a seat in Con-
gress is also rising dramatically. In the
1975-76 election cycle, House winners
spent $38 million, an average of over
$87,000 each. In the 1983-84 election
cycle, House winners spent $117 mil-
lion, an average of $269,956 each. On
the Senate side, winners spent $20 mil-
lion in the 1975-76 cycle, an average of
$606,060; in 1984 elections, Senate
winners spent $94.8 million, an average
of $2.9 million each.
About rising campaign expenditures
Senator Goldwater has said,
Unlimited campaign spending eats at the
heart of the democratic process. It feeds the
growth of special interest groups created
solely to channel money into political cam-
paigns.... And it causes elected officials to
devote more time to raising money than to
their public duties. 28
And Senator Eagleton has said on the
Senate floor:
Throughout the last decade, the money
factor has exploded exponentially. Most of
us have our &dquo;tin cups&dquo; for alms-begging; our
call lists to fat cats; our endless procession of
fundraising receptions; our direct mail pleas;
and so forth.
The money race never ends. Senators start
the process in the early years of their 6-year
terms by &dquo;building a war chest&dquo; for their
reelection. House Members start on the
Wednesday after the Tuesday elections to
amass the funds for the next go-around.29
THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM AGENDA
A number of changes in federal elec-
tion law are needed if the campaign
finance reform effort begun over a
decade ago is to be finished. In some
cases, unfinished business needs to be
completed. The foremost item of old
business, of course, is a fundamental
restructuring of the congressional cam-
paign-financing system. In addition, new
problems that have emerged in the years
since Watergate need to be addressed.
Adjustments to the presidential public
financing system-a system that is
fundamentally sound and that has dem-
onstrated its effectiveness-need to be
made. A campaign finance reform
agenda today should include congres-
sional campaign finance reform, inde-
pendent expenditures, and soft money,
as well as other issues.
26. Remarks of Senator Barry Goldwater, in
U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
99th Cong., 1st sess., 131(165):16679.
27. Remarks of Senator David Boren, in ibid., 
no. 164, p. 16605.
28. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on
Rules and Administration, Hearings on Cam-
pcign Finance Reform Proposals of 1983, p. 403.
29. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional




The major unfinished business on the
reform agenda is a thorough overhaul of
the congressional campaign finance sys-
tem. Comprehensive legislation is
needed that includes the following
essential components: limitations on
overall PAC receipts, provision of an
alternative campaign fund source, and
limits on overall campaign spending and
on the expenditure of a candidate’s
personal funds.
Limitations on overall PAC receipts.
While current law restricts the amount
that an individual PAC may give to a
candidate, there is no restriction on the
total amount that a candidate may
accept from all PACs. Thus in the last
two elections we have seen four Senate
candidates who have each accepted
more than $1 million in PAC funds. An
overall limit on aggregate PAC receipts
would help shift the focus of congres-
sional fund-raising away from large
PAC contributions and back to small
contributions from individual donors.
An amendment establishing an over-
all limit on PAC receipts was adopted
by the House in 1979-the Obey-Rails-
back bill-but was not considered by
the Senate. The introduction in 1985 of
a PAC-limit amendment by Senators
Boren and Goldwater revived congres-
sional consideration of the concept of an
aggregate PAC limit. 30
Alternative campaign funds. Essen-
tial to the presidential public financing
system are the federal funds made avail-
able to presidential candidates. Con-
gressional campaign finance reform
legislation similarly needs to provide
alternative sources of campaign funds
to candidates. This could be done in the
form of public funds to match small
contributions from individuals, as is
done in the presidential nominating
process, or grants to candidates, as is
done in the presidential general election,
or a 100 percent tax credit for small
contributions to candidates,3’ or some
combination of these systems. The
creation of a broad-based alternative
financing system will once again make
elective office a realistic ambition for
individuals without personal fortunes
and for those who are unwilling or
unable to raise large sums from PACs.
Overall campaign spending and can-
didates’personal funds. Limits on over-
all spending and the use of personal
funds are a key feature of the presi-
dential public financing system and are
needed for congressional campaigns as
well. The Supreme Court in its 1976
Buckley decision upheld the constitu-
tionality of such limits as part of a
system providing public financing for
presidential candidates, but the Court
struck down the spending limits enacted
for congressional races because they
were not tied to any public campaign
finance system. It is clear from the
Buckley decision that limits for con-
gressional races along with limits on the
use of personal funds can be constitu-
tionally enacted as part of a public
finance campaign system.
In crafting reform legislation, it is
important to ensure that spending limits
are set at levels high enough to allow
30. S. 1806, printed in ibid., no. 146, p. 14360;
debate on S. 1806 is found in ibid., no 164,
p. 16603; see also ibid., no. 165, p. 16678.
31. See, for example, H.R. 2490, printed in
U.S., Congress, House, Congressional Record,
98th Cong., 1st sess., 129(45):1992; H.R. 4428, in
ibid., no. 159, p. 10056; and U.S., Congress,
Senate, Congressional Record, 99th Cong., 1st
sess., 131(143):14065.
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challengers to run competitive cam-
paigns. Since any campaign-financing
system that includes spending limits
must be voluntary under the Buckley
decision, candidates who felt unable to
wage effective congressional campaigns
within the spending limits would be free
to run their races without public finan-
cing. Those who claim that public finan-
cing with spending limits favors the
reelection of incumbents should not lose
sight of the fact that in the first two
presidential elections conducted under
the presidential public financing sys-
tem-1976 and 1980-incumbents were
defeated, for the first time since 1932.
Nor should these critics forget that it is
incumbent members of Congress who
thus far have failed to rush to enact
public financing for congressional races.
For the past decade a majority of incum-
bent members do not appear to have
reached the conclusion that public
financing and spending limits are an
incumbent’s advantage.
Enactment of a new campaign-finan-
cing system for Congress would free our
elected representatives from their dan-
gerous dependence on special interest
contributions. A new system is also
essential if we are to restore public
confidence in the integrity of Congress
and its members.
Two additional major changes are
needed to protect the integrity of the
presidential public financing system and
any new system established for congres-
sional campaigns. The changes deal
with the issues of independent expendi-
tures and soft money.
Independent expenditures
Under the Court’s decision in Buck-
ley, contributions made directly to a
candidate may constitutionally be lim-
ited, but no limits may be imposed on
expenditures undertaken independently
by a PAC or an individual on behalf of
or in opposition to a candidate.
Through these so-called independent
expenditures, PACs and individuals can
evade the intent of limits on direct
contributions. They can and do spend
substantial sums-far in excess of statu-
tory contribution limits-supporting or
attacking candidates.
Independent spenders are unaccount-
able. They do not have to assume respon-
sibility at election time, nor do they face
the political impact of any misrepre-
sentation they may make. A leader in
the independent spending movement,
Terry Dolan of the National Conserva-
tive Political Action Committee, has
said, &dquo;A group like ours could lie
through its teeth and the candidate it
helps stays clean. ,31
The persistent use of independent
spending in politics alters the political
process for the worse.33 Independent
spending can seriously distort the com-
petition between candidates. Candidates
are faced with spending not only by their
opponents but also by independent
groups. Senator Ernest Hollings, Demo-
crat of South Carolina, has noted, &dquo;We
all have seen how PACs can seriously
damage the balance in a campaign
through the expenditure of enormous
amounts of money. In effect, a candi-
date budgets to fight one well-financed
opponent but then ends up fighting
many.
32. Myra MacPherson, "The New Right Bri-
gade," Washington Post, 10 Aug. 1980.
33. See, for example, David Broder, "Equal
Time for Targets," Washington Post, 26 Aug.
1981; "Nick-Pack Strikes Home," New York
Times, 18 Nov. 1981.
34. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 131(80):8268.
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Within the confines of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Buckley and later
cases, there are steps that can and
should be taken to curb the impact of
independent expenditures. First, the
Buckley decision specified that indepen-
dent expenditure activities are exempt
from limitation only if they are not
coordinated with candidates or the
agents of candidates. Additional legis-
lation and regulations should be devel-
oped to clarify the standards to be used
in assessing the true independence of an
expenditure campaign.&dquo;
Second, and more important, the
federal communication statutes should
be amended to provide to federal candi-
dates free and equal time to respond to
broadcast advertisements purchased by
means of independent expenditures.
Under a response-time proposal, radio
and television stations would be
required to provide free and equal time
to candidates for federal office in cases
where a broadcaster sells time to any
person-aside from federal candidates-
to broadcast material that either
endorses or opposes a candidate. If the
broadcast advertisement opposes a can-
didate, that candidate would be entitled
at no cost to an equal amount of broad-
cast time. If the broadcast advertisement
endorses a candidate, other legally qual-
ified candidates for the same office
would be entitled at no cost to an equal
amount of broadcast time. The response-
time concept builds upon existing re-
sponsibilities placed on broadcasters-
such as the personal-attack rule-and is
a constitutional extension of existing
communication standards that have been
upheld by the courts.
Response time would help to protect
the integrity of the present system of
contribution limits by assuring that a
candidate could respond without major
expense to an independent expenditure
campaign. Response time would enable
candidates to refute misrepresentations
made by independent spenders. A
response-time proposal would not end
independent expenditures, but it would
restore some measure of accountability
to independent spending activities.36
The response-time proposal has been
included as a major provision of S. 1310,
the Clean Campaign Act of 1985, intro-
duced in the Ninety-ninth Congress by
Senators John Danforth, Republican of
Missouri, Ernest Hollings, Democrat of
South Carolina, and Barry Goldwater,
Republican of Arizona.3’ This proposal
35. Wertheimer and Huwa, "Campaign Finance
Reforms: Past Accomplishments, Future Chal-
lenges," p. 64.
36. Fred Wertheimer, "Fixing Election Law,"
New York Times, 3 Sept. 1981. See also Ronald
Brownstein, "Soft Money," National Journal, 7
Dec. 1985, p. 2828; Center for Responsive Politics,
Money and Politics: Soft Money&mdash;A Loophole
for the ’80s (Washington, DC: Center for Respon-
sive Politics, 1985); Common Cause, "Comments
of Common Cause with Respect to Its Petition for
Rulemaking Regarding ’Soft Money,’ " (Manu-
script, Common Cause, 1985); Elizabeth Drew,
Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption
(New York: Macmillan, 1983); Thomas Edsall,
"Loophole Lets Parties Raise Millions from Firms,
Unions," Washington Post, 17 Apr. 1984; idem,
’’’Soft Money’ Will Finance Voter Sign Up," ibid.,
12 Aug. 1984; Maxwell Glen, "Republicans and
Democrats Battling to Raise Big Bucks for Voter
Drives," National Journal, Sept. 1984,
pp. 1618-22; "Soft Money," Washington Post, 31
Aug. 1984; "The Soft-Money Loophole," ibid., 1
Nov. 1985; Ed Zuckerman, "Lobbying and Cam-
paign Ethics: The Ethical Implications of ’Soft
Money’ 
" 
(Remarks delivered at George Wash-
ington University, Washington, DC, 28 Oct.
1985); idem, "Democrat ’Soft Money’ Nets Catch
$30 Million," PACs & Lobbies, 21 Nov. 1984;
idem, "’Soft Money’: A New Life for ’Fat Cats,’"
ibid., 16 Jan. 1985; and idem, "More DNC ’Soft
Money’ Accounts Found," ibid., 6 Feb. 1985.
37. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional
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In federal elections the amounts that
individuals and PACs may contribute
are limited; direct contributions from
corporations and unions are completely
barred; and all contributions in excess
of $200 are subject to public-disclosure
requirements. In many states, however,
parallel regulations do not exist. In the
1980s, so-called soft money has increas-
ingly been funneled to state party
organizations. Soft money funds are
contributions from sources-corpora-
tions or unions-that are not permitted
to make any direct contributions in
federal elections, and contributions
from individuals or groups in amounts
above the federal limits.
While soft money is purportedly for
use in party-building activities at the
state and local levels, there is increasing
evidence that these funds are in fact
being spent in connection with federal
candidates, particularly presidential can-
didates, in violation of federal law. This
is one of the most serious problems in
the campaign finance area today. This
practice seriously undermines the integ-
rity of the contribution limits and pro-
hibitions contained in the federal law,
including the limits on contributions by
political parties, the expenditure limits
in the presidential public financing sys-
tem, and disclosure requirements of the
federal election law.39
In 1984, Common Cause proposed to
the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
that new regulations be adopted to
control the use of the soft-money sub-
terfuge. Under these regulations,
national-level political party commit-
tees, including party congressional cam-
paign committees, and federal officials
would be prohibited from establishing
soft-money accounts or from otherwise
channeling to state parties for use in
federal campaigns contributions that
would be illegal under federal law. 40
A number of additional campaign
finance issues have arisen in the 1980s
Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 131(80):8267; see
also Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, Hearings on S. 1310,
the Clean Campaign Act of 1985, 99th Cong., 1st
sess., 10 Sept. 1985; ibid., 8 Oct. 1985.
38. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 131(146):14361.
39. See, for example, Brownstein, "Soft
Money," p. 2828; Center for Responsive Politics,
Money and Politics: Soft Money; Common
Cause, "Comments of Common Cause with
Respect to Its Petition"; Drew, Politics and
Money; Edsall, "Loophole Lets Parties Raise";
idem, " ’Soft Money’ Will Finance Voter Sign
Up"; Glen, "Republicans and Democrats Bat-
tling," pp. 1618-22; "Soft Money," Washington
Post; "Soft Money Loophole"; Zuckerman, "Lob-
bying and Campaign Ethics"; idem, "Democrat
’Soft Money’ "; idem, 
" ’Soft Money’: A New
Life"; and idem, "More DNC ’Soft Money’
Accounts Found."
40. In a 5 Nov. 1984 letter to Lee Ann Elliott,
chair of the FEC, Common Cause urged the
commission to take the following steps regarding
soft money practices: (1) to initiate on a priority
basis its own broad-ranging factual investigation
into soft-money practices, with a view toward
prosecuting actual past violations; (2) to initiate a
rule-making proceeding to establish the broader
administrative tools, such as additional disclosure
requirements, needed to facilitate the commis-
sion’s effective enforcement of the current laws;
and (3) to undertake a review of the current laws to
determine what additional statutory remedies may
be required to assure that soft-money abuses are
most effectively curtailed. On 4 Feb. 1985 Com-
mon Cause submitted to the FEC "Comments of
Common Cause with Respect to Its Petition for
Rulemaking Regarding ’Soft Money’ 
" and
thereby set out its formal proposal for rule making
on soft money.
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that require legislative action. Congress
should address delegate committee
spending, candidate and officeholder
PACs, presidential candidate founda-




While presidential candidates who
receive federal matching funds do so in
return for a commitment to limit their
overall and state-by-state spending,
individuals who are seeking selection as
delegates to a party’s nominating con-
vention are presently not subject to
these limitations. Expenditures by the
committees of these delegates create the
capacity to bypass these spending limits,
particularly if the expenditures are
made at the direction of, with the encour-
agement of, or in conjunction with a
candidate’s campaign.4’ Federal elec-
tion law needs to be amended to apply
the limitations on contributions and
expenditures to convention delegates.42
Candidate and
officeholder PACs
A growing number of presidential
candidates and members of Congress
are establishing their own PACs. These
PACs, like others, may make campaign
contributions. In many cases, particu-
larly in the case of presidential hopefuls,
these PACs are also used to finance a
candidate’s political travel and related
expenses, expenditures that at this point
do not count against the spending ceil-
ings of the presidential public financing
system. These PACs also allow larger
individual and PAC contributions to be
made to the candidate or officeholder
involved than could be made to his or
her candidate campaign committee.
They also place officeholders and office
seekers in the position of using PAC
money to curry favor. Congress should
ban the creation of PACs by members of
Congress and by prospective candidates
for president or vice-president. 41
Presidential
candidate foundations
An increasing number of public fig-
ures, particularly prospective presiden-
tial candidates, have set up tax-exempt
foundations. Unlike campaign commit-
tees, these foundations may accept
unlimited amounts of money, including
contributions from corporations and
unions, and they are not required to
report the source of their funds. Dona-
tions to these foundations, furthermore,
are fully tax deductible.
These foundations, established to do
research on issues and to undertake
other educational activities, in theory
are not linked to any individual. In
practice, however, they can pay and
have paid for travel by presidential
hopefuls and have provided informa-
tion that forms the basis of campaign
position papers-activities that appear
41. Similarly, delegate committees enable indi-
viduals and PACs to override the contribution
limits to a presidential candidate by making
multiple contributions to numerous delegate
committees, all of which are intended to benefit
directly a single presidential candidate’s campaign.
Such contributions serve to undermine the effec-
tiveness of the existing contribution limits.
42. Thomas Edsall, "Candidates Find It Easy
to Give Spending Curbs the Runaround," Wash-
ington Post, 3 June 1984; Brooks Jackson,
"Loopholes Allow Flood of Campaign Giving by
Businesses, Fat Cats," Wall Street Journal, 5 July
1984.
43. See Maxwell Glen, "Starting a PAC May
Be Candidates’ First Step Down Long Road to
1988," National Journal, 16 Feb. 1985, pp. 374-77.
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to help promote the public officials who
created them.44 At a minimum, tax-
exempt foundations that are controlled
by or maintained for a political candi-
date should be required to disclose the
source and amount of contributions
received.45
Bundling
Another development on the cam-
paign-financing landscape that Con-
gress must address is bundling, a
practice by which a PAC puts together,
or bundles, numerous individual checks
made out to a particular candidate’s
campaign and provides them to the
candidate. This practice presently is
being used by PACs effectively to evade
the contribution limits of the federal
election laws. By aggregating these indi-
vidual contributions a single PAC can
provide to a candidate amounts far in
excess of the current $5000-per-election
limitation. A Wall Street Journal story,
for example, noted that one insurance
company PAC was able to funnel contri-
butions of more than $168,000 to one
senator’s reelection campaign through
bundling.46
Under current FEC regulations, the
bundled contributions are not treated as
a contribution by the intermediary PAC
unless it actually controls the choice of
the recipient. The result is a loophole
that is increasingly being exploited by
PACs to expand their capacity to exert
influence and to undermine the contri-
bution limits.
The bundling loophole should be
closed by amending federal election law
to provide that bundled contributions
would count against the contribution
limits of both the individual contributor
and the intermediary person or PAC.
That is, if a PAC collects or otherwise
aggregates contributions that are ear-
marked or directed to a particular
candidate’s campaign and assists in
transmitting these contributions to that
campaign, the contributions will be con-
sidered contributions to the candidate
by the conduit PAC as well as by the
original individual contributor.
Grandfather clause
In 1979 Congress amended federal
law to prohibit candidates from con-
verting surplus campaign funds for per-
sonal use. Under a grandfather clause
included in that amendment, however,
any member of Congress who was in
office on 8 January 1980 is permitted to
keep his or her surplus campaign con-
tributions for personal use after leaving
Congress. Members who qualify under
this provision may thus take campaign
money upon retirement. These surplus
campaign funds, in some cases, now
range to amounts as high as $600,000.
While House and Senate rules prohibit
conversion of these funds for personal
44. As David Spear, a spokesman for former
Senate majority leader Howard Baker, has noted,
"If it’s not a violation of the law, it’s certainly a
violation of the spirit of the law ... candidates
ought not to be able to raise campaign funds under
the guise of a tax-free foundation." Bryan Abas,
"Hart Has a Better Idea," Westword, 13-19 Nov.
1985, p. 8.
45. See Report of the Commission on National
Elections, Executive Summary, p. 8; Paul West,
" ’Foundations’ Are Promoting Politicians," Bal-
timore Sun, 29 Sept. 1985; and Thomas Edsall,
"’88 Candidates’ New Tricks Stretch Federal Elec-
tion Law," Washington Post, 20 Oct. 1985.
46. Brooks Jackson, "Insurance Industry
Boosts Political Contributions as Congress Takes
up Cherished Tax Preferences," Wall Street Jour-
nal, 10 Oct. 1985. See also idem, "GOP Group
Uses Cash Creatively," ibid., 13 Sept. 1984; and
Michael Wines, "Bundling: A New U.S. Cam-
paign Custom," Los Angeles Times, 3 Oct. 1981.
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use while members remain in office,
several members who have retired have
in fact converted surplus funds for
personal use. Other members, still in
Congress, seem to regard building up
campaign surpluses as a new form of
political individual retirement account. 47
Congress already has recognized the
problems inherent in allowing retiring
members to convert contributions into
personal funds by banning this activity
for many members. It should complete
the task started in 1979 and remove the
grandfather clause, which allows some
members to escape the ban.
FEC
While it is important to examine the
rules for congressional and presidential
campaign financing, a careful assess-
ment must also be made of the FEC, the
body responsible for enforcing federal
election laws.
The commission has failed the public
in several important respects. Most sig-
nificantly, it is ponderously slow in its
enforcement proceedings and is often
prone to concentrate on technicalities
rather than major issues of rule making.
While the FEC’s efforts at promoting
disclosure of the receipts and expendi-
tures of PACs and candidates have been
a major success, lax enforcement by the
commission threatens to undermine the
effectiveness of the prohibitions, restric-
tions, and limits of the federal election
law.
Both external and internal organiza-
tional factors act to undermine the
effectiveness of the FEC. Congress
created the commission with a partisan
split and has never clarified the roles of
the staff director and general counsel,
the two statutory officers of the com-
mission. Consequently, the FEC has
failed to have management and policy
direction. Congress also consistently
underfunds the agency, making it more
difficult for the commission to carry out
its various responsibilities.
The performance of the FEC is criti-
cal to the effective implementation of
federal election laws. Congress needs to
consider changes in both the structure
and the administration of the commis-
sion to ensure the proper implementa-
tion of federal election laws.48
CONCLUSION
In the spring of 1973, Common
Cause chairman John Gardner told the
Senate Commerce Committee that &dquo;there
is nothing in our political system today
that creates more mischief, more cor-
ruption, and more alienation and dis-
trust on the part of the public than does
our system of financing elections. ,,49
Despite major progress in improving the
presidential campaign-financing system,
47. At the end of the 1984 election cycle, for
instance, members of the House who could con-
vert surplus funds upon retirement had average
cash-on-hand figures of $106,935; their colleagues
who were not grandfathered averaged $50,421.
See Lee Norrgard, "You Can Take It with You,"
Common Cause Magazine, p. 9 (May-June 1985);
Maxwell Glen, "Finishing a Campaign in the
Black Becoming More Prevalent in the House,"
National Journal, 22 June 1985, pp. 1467-69;
Kevin Chaffee, "Money under the Mattress: What
Congressmen Don’t Spend," Washington Monthly,
pp. 32-38 (Sept. 1984).
48. See generally Common Cause, Stalled
from the Start (Washington, DC: Common
Cause, 1981); see also William C. Oldaker, "Of
Philosophers, Foxes, and Finances: Can the Fed-
eral Election Commission Ever Do an Adequate
Job?" this issue of The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science.
49. Statement of John Gardner, in U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Commerce Committee, Hear-
ings on S. 372, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. 1973, p. 1.
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that observation remains true today
with regard to the congressional cam-
paign-financing system. As former
Watergate special prosecutor and cur-
rent Common Cause chairman Archi-
bald Cox has observed, inaction has
resulted in &dquo;a Congress still more deeply
trapped in the stranglehold of special
interests which threatens to paralyze the
process of democratic government.’,50
Congress needs to complete the reforms
begun in the wake of Watergate by
fundamentally transforming its own
campaign-financing system and by mak-
ing other adjustments needed to preserve
the integrity of presidential public finan-
cing, campaign reporting requirements,
and limitations on contributions by
individuals and PACs.
A consensus has been reached in this
country that PACs are inimical to our
system of representative government . 51
The question now remaining is whether
that public consensus can be translated
into congressional action.
No solution that may be adopted will
be final and perfect. We will always need
to reevaluate and adjust any campaign
finance system. The presidential public
financing system demonstrates the need
for periodic adjustments. But more impor-
tant, the experience of presidential
public financing shows us that funda-
mental improvement in our campaign
finance laws is indeed attainable.
We can and must have a better system
for financing congressional campaigns.
Representative government is at stake.
50. Archibald Cox, Address before the Com-
monwealth Club of California, San Francisco,
CA, 7 Jan. 1981.
51. A May 1984 Harris survey, for example,
found that "a 70-20 percent majority of all likely
voters across the country feels that candidates for
federal office should refuse to accept PAC funds." 
Louis Harris, "PACs: Good or Bad Influence,"
Harris Survey, 31 May 1984.
